Previous research shows that women are more altruist than men in dictator game experiments. Yet, little is known whether women are expected to be more altruist than men. Here we elicit third-parties' beliefs about dictators' donations conditional on knowing the gender of the dictator. Our data provide evidence of three main findings: (i) women are expected to be more altruist than men; (ii) both men and women have correct beliefs about the level of altruism among men; and (iii) both men and women overestimate the level of altruism among women. In doing so, our results uncover a perception gap according to which, although women are more altruist than men, they are expected to be even more altruist than they actually are.
Introduction
The exploration of gender differences in decision making has a long tradition in behavioural economics and other social sciences, and has touched several research areas, including risk-aversion, competitive behaviour, and social preferences.
For example, a classical study by Eckel and Grossman (2002) has shown that women are more risk averse than men, while an equally classical study by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) has shown that women are less competitive than men. In terms of social preferences, results are more mixed: while previous research has not uncovered any obvious gender difference in cooperative behaviour (see Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a review), experimental studies have repeatedly found that women are, on average, more altruist than men (Bolton and Katok (1995) ; Eckel and Grossman (1998) ; Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) ; Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) ; Houser and Schunk (2009); Dreber et al. (2014) ; Capraro and Marcelletti (2014); Capraro (2015) ). More recently, Rand et al. (2016) have extended this line of research by showing, through a metaanalysis of 22 studies, that promoting intuition versus reflection increases altruistic behaviour among women, but not among men, suggesting that women but not men have internalised altruism as their spontaneous reaction.
Other studies have shown that women tend to be more altruistic than men when investing in human capital for children. For example, women allocate more resources for women's and children's clothing relative to men's clothing (Lundberg et al. (1997) ), invest more in health and nutrition for children (Duflo (2000) ), and spend more on child goods and small scale livestock (Rubalcava et al. (2009) ) than men.
Despite the vast research in gender differences, the literature has mostly neglected the inverse question of whether people have gender stereotypes in specific decisional settings. Understanding whether people have correct beliefs about others' behaviour is an important question per se, because the standard equilibrium analysis assumes that people strategise on their beliefs about their counterparts' behaviour (Camerer et al. (2004) ); and it becomes even more important when it comes to gender differences, since one of the dominant explanations for gender differences in decision-making relies on the assumption that the behaviour of men and women is governed by stereotypes regarding their social roles (Eagly (1987); Brescoll (2011) ). In sum, understanding whether there is a correspondence between stereotypes of men and women and their actual behaviour is an important question, with potential consequences in economic and psychological modelling.
Given the aforementioned literature showing that women are more altruistic than men, here we ask whether this gender difference in behaviour corresponds to a gender difference in stereotypes. We move a first step into this research area by starting from a simple question: are women expected to be more altruistic than men?
To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of papers have approached this question, and mostly did so from a psychological perspective. For example, Heilman and Chen (2005) showed that work-related altruism is less optional for women than for men, and Heilman and Okimoto (2007) showed that penalties for women's success in male domains result from the perceived violation of gender-stereotypic prescriptions. From an economic perspective, we are aware of only one study devoted to eliciting participants' beliefs about the level of altruism in men and women (Aguiar et al. (2009) ). In this lab experiment, subjects were presented with two boxes, A and B, where A contained donations left by men and B contained donations left by women. Subjects were informed that they could choose only one of the two boxes and one donation would be taken at random from the selected box and used to pay them. Results showed that subjects were more likely to select donations from the "women" box, indicating that women were indeed expected to be more generous than men.
Although it represents an important first step towards understanding whether women are expected to be more altruistic than men, the work by Aguiar et al. (2009) has two important limitations. First of all, while it shows that women are expected to be more generous than men, it does not show whether people have correct beliefs about the behaviour of men and women. Thus, it remains unclear whether people have correct stereotypes regarding each gender's level of altruism. Second, it is only one study: the recent outbreak of the replicability crisis (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) calls for more studies.
In the current work, we wish to fill these gaps by: (i) replicating the result that women are expected to be more generous than men; and (ii) giving a quantitative version of this result. This allows to answer the question: do men and women fulfil people's expectations about altruistic behaviour?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Next section is devoted to methods; section 3 focuses on results and discussion; last section concludes.
Method

Subject pool
Subjects were living in the US at the time of the experiment and were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci et al. (2010) ; Horton et al. (2011) ; Mason and Suri (2012) ; Paolacci and Chandler (2014) ) to play a standard Dictator Game (Kahneman et al. (1986) ; Forsythe et al. (1994) ).
In the Dictator Game, one player acts in the role of the dictator and the other one in the role of the receiver. Dictators are given a certain amount of money and are asked how much, if any, they want to give to the receiver. Receivers have no choice and only get what the dictators decide to give. Since dictators have no incentives to give money, a payoff-maximising dictator would donate nothing. For this reason, dictators' donations are taken as a measure of individual's altruism, or inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999) ; Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) ; Brañas-Garza (2006 , 2007 ; Charness and Gneezy (2008) ).
Protocol
In our experiment, subjects were randomly divided between dictators and receivers. Dictators: They were given $0.20 and were asked to decide how much, if any, to give to the receiver. Before making their decision, dictators were asked two comprehension questions. Specifically, they were asked which choice would maximise their payoff and which choice would maximise the receiver's payoff. Subjects failing any comprehension question were automatically excluded from the survey. This screening procedure had the effect that we had fewer dictators (N = 456) than receivers (N = 530). Thus, the computation of receivers' payoffs is not straightforward, since there is no oneto-one correspondence between dictators and receivers. To address this problem, receivers were sequentially paired with a randomly selected dictator; in case a dictator was already used to pay another receiver, we paid the current recipient 'out of our pocket', and not using the donation of that dictator, because that donation had already been used. This procedure is doable on Amazon Mechanical Turk, because participants are matched only after the end of the experiment.
Receivers: A part from potentially receiving money from dictators, receivers played also as guessers. Specifically, they were asked to predict the donation that another dictator would make to another receiver. They would receive, on top of the actual donation, $0.20 reward for correct guesses. Since they do not guess their own donation there is no opportunity to hedge (Brañas-Garza et al. (2016) ). To elicit recipients' expectations, we designed four treatments:
O n : recipients were presented with the same screenshots shown to dictators and they were asked to guess the dictator's decision (N = 134);
O mow : was identical to O n with the only difference that recipients were informed that the dictator was either a man or a woman (N = 140).
O m : was identical to O n with the only difference that recipients were informed that the dictator was a man (N = 124);
O w : was identical to O m with the only difference that recipients were informed that the dictator was a woman (N = 132).
We need both O n and O mow baselines for two reasons: on the one hand, by comparing O m and O w with O mow , separately, we may investigate the effect of making one particular gender salient versus making both genders salient; on the other hand, by comparing dictators' donations with O n , we can explore whether people have correct beliefs about the level of altruism in anonymous strangers.
Results
Descriptive statistics
A total of 986 subjects (56% men, mean age = 34.5 years) participated in our experiment. The average donation was 27.3% of the total endowment, which is very close to the average donation reported in Engel's metaanalysis of 616 Dictator game experiments conducted in the standard physical laboratory (28.3%, Engel (2011) ). This confirms the reliability of data collected on Amazon Mechanical Turk using very small stakes, a fact that was already observed in the context of the Dictator Game by d 'Adda et al. (2015) . Although the pie size was $0.20 data are normalised such that the donations correspond to 0-10. Next we pass to the analysis of treatment effects.
Gender framed vs nonframed treatments
As a preliminary step we start by looking at framing effects on recipients' beliefs. Both treatments O n and O mow report similar averages (2.79 and 3.16, resp.). Figure 1a to Figure 1c provide visual evidence that we can reject the hypothesis that men are expected to be as altruistic as the average person and that women are expected to be as altruistic as the average person. Figure 1d focuses on the CDFs (cumulative distribution functions). While males' CDF is closer to the top right -more selfish -Females CDF is closer to the bottom left -more generous. It is easy to check that O w stocastically dominates O m which is consistent with the test shown in Table 1 . The entire distribution of O w is always toward the right of the rest of distributions. In sum, women are expected to me more altruistic than men.
Result 1
Women are expected to be more altruistic than men.
Are women actually more generous than men?
In the previous subsection, we have shown that women are expected to be more altruistic than men in a Dictator Game. Is this expectation grounded or not? Figure 2a and Figure 2b respectively compare the distribution of donations for both men and women, and provides visual evidence that women are, on average, more altruist than men (means: 3.04 vs 2.49; ttest, p = 0.03; z-test, p = 0.01). In fact, giving nothing is the modal value for males (49.6% gave 0) while giving the equal split is the modal value for women (48.3% gave half).
In sum, not only women are expected to be more generous than men, but they are de facto more generous than men.
Result 2 Women are more altruistic than men.
Do subjects have correct beliefs about each gender's average level of generosity?
In the previous subsections, we have shown that women are expected to be more altruistic than men and that this expectation is grounded, in the sense that women are actually more altruistic than men. Now, we ask whether people have correct beliefs about each gender's average level of generosity. We begin by observing that subjects have, on average, correct beliefs about the average level of altruism. Specifically, the mean level of altruism across the experiment (both males and females) is 2.735, while the mean level of expected generosity in the O n condition is 2.798 (t-test, p = 0.81; z-test, p = 0.83), see Table 1 bottom). Hence subjects have correct beliefs about average level of generosity, which in turn means that we do not observe either wishful thinking or pessimism.
Next we analyse whether subjects have correct beliefs about men's average level of altruism. Figures 3a analyses accuracy of beliefs for men and shows that there is no discrepancies since both expectations and actual behavior are almost identical (CDFs are on parallel).
Controlling for the gender of the recipient, we also find that both men and women have, on average, correct beliefs about men's level of altruism (t-test, guess by men p = 0.21 and guess by women p = 0.60; z-test, guess by men p = 0.22 and guess by women p = 0.44, see Table 1 bottom).
Result 3 Both men and women have correct beliefs about average level of generosity in men.
However Figure 3b shows strong discrepancies between current behaviour and expectations for women: females are not as gen-erous as they are expected to be (O w CDF dominates the D w CDF).
This remains true also after controlling for gender. Both men and women overestimate women's average level of generosity (t-test, both p-values < 0.03; z-test, both pvalues < 0.02, see Table 1 ). 
Result 4 Both men and women overestimate the level of generosity in women.
Conclusion
Here we have used Dictator Game experiments to measure people's expectations about dictators' level of generosity, conditional on knowing the gender of the dictator. Our data provide evidence of three major results: (i) women are expected to be more generous than men (replicating Aguiar et al. (2009) results); (ii) both men and women have correct beliefs about the mean level of generosity among men; (iii) both men and women overestimate the level of generosity among women.
In doing so, our experiment uncovers a perception gap according to which, although women are more altruist than men, they are expected to be even more altruistic than they actually are. This result is particularly puzzling since it regards also women: while women have correct beliefs about the level of altruism in men, they overestimate the level of altruism in other women. We hope that future research can shed light on the ultimate origin of this perception gap and on the potential psychological and economic consequences that can have on women's and men's behaviour. 
